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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Antonio Figueroa appeals the District Court‟s 
September 11, 2012, judgments of conviction and sentence.  
Figueroa was convicted of civil rights violations under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment.  On appeal, he challenges his conviction on 
four grounds:  (1) the District Court erred by admitting the 
out-of-court statement of co-defendant Robert Bayard, (2) the 
District Court erred by excluding, as cumulative, police 
reports that Figueroa offered into evidence, (3) the District 
Court erred by allowing improper expert opinion testimony 
from a prosecution fact witness on issues of constitutional 
law, and (4) the District Court erred by refusing to give the 
jury Figueroa‟s requested instruction concerning specific 
intent.  Figueroa challenges his sentence on two grounds:  (1) 
the District Court erred by applying the drug distribution 
sentencing guideline to Figueroa‟s civil rights violations, and 
(2) his sentence was substantively unreasonable.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
judgments of conviction and sentence. 
 
I. Background 
Figueroa joined the police force in Camden, New 
Jersey, in 2003.  In July 2008, he was transferred to a new 
Special Operations Unit created to target guns, drugs and 
violence in Camden‟s most crime ridden neighborhoods.  
Figueroa was assigned to the “fourth platoon” with his regular 
partner, Robert Bayard, as well as Sergeant Dan Morris, and 
officers Jason Stetser and Kevin Parry.  On September 6, 
2011, Figueroa and Bayard were charged in a six count 
superseding indictment with a series of civil rights violations.  
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In addition to five substantive civil rights violations, they 
were charged with conspiring with Stetser, Parry, and Morris 
to deprive others of their civil rights.  A three week jury trial 
began on November 15, 2011.  Stetser, Parry, and Morris all 
testified at trial as cooperating witnesses with plea 
agreements.  Other law enforcement officers and citizens who 
were victims of or witnesses to the activities alleged in the 
indictment also testified.  Over the course of trial, the 
government presented evidence regarding twelve incidents in 
which Figueroa allegedly deprived individuals of their civil 
rights.  There are six specific incidents of misconduct 
described below that are relevant to Figueroa‟s arguments on 
appeal. 
 
August 9, 2008:  Figueroa and Stetser were 
conducting surveillance on an open-air drug market and 
observed “A.K” sell drugs to “T.C.”  When they arrested the 
participants, Stetser found a bundle of crack cocaine and 
Figueroa found a bag filled with money.  Morris, Figueroa, 
and Stetser took some of this money for themselves.  After 
the arrest, T.C. cooperated with the officers and gave them 
information about other drug-dealing activity, but A.K. did 
not.  Stetser and Figueroa attributed to A.K. drugs and a gun 
that were not actually found on him.  Specifically, they 
attributed to him (1) drugs that Stetser had stashed in a nearby 
tree, (2) a handgun located in a house that T.C. told them 
about, and (3) the “re-up stash” of drugs they found in a 
nearby garage.  Figueroa wrote the falsified police report 
about this incident. 
 
September 14, 2008:  Figueroa, Stetser, Parry, and 
Morris conducted illegal searches in the Winslow Court 
apartment complex based on information from an informant.  
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The officers broke into Apartment C, where they found 
between $1,500 and $2,000, and then searched, without 
consent or a warrant, Apartment G, where they found 
$10,000.  When they found no drugs, they confronted their 
informant who pointed them to a mailbox in the complex, 
where they found a large stash of cocaine.  Figueroa wrote the 
police report, in which he falsely claimed that they had seen 
someone take drugs out of the mailbox, throw a bag in 
Apartment G and flee through Apartment C.  The report 
stated that they had recovered only $1,531 in cash. 
 
September 17, 2008:  Figueroa and Bayard arrested 
“D.B.#1” on the street who then told them that he had a gun 
at home.  The officers then drove to his house, coerced his 
mother into signing a consent to search form, and found a 
firearm in a bedroom closet.  Figueroa‟s police report falsely 
claimed that he found the firearm in plain view after chasing 
D.B.#1 into the house and arresting him there.  Figueroa also 
underreported the amount of money that was seized during 
the events. 
 
September 17, 2008:  Figueroa, Bayard, Stetser, and 
Parry apprehended “A.F” and “T.R.”  Angry that A.F. and 
T.R. had fought them, Figueroa, Bayard, Stetser, and Parry 
decided to plant drugs on A.F. and T.R.  Bayard wrote the 
false police report about this incident. 
 
 April 3, 2009:  Figueroa, Stetser, and Parry, based on 
information from an informant, found “L.M.” in a car and 
searched the car, expecting to find drugs.  They found no 
drugs in L.M.‟s car, but Parry found crack cocaine in the gas 
cap of a vehicle that was parked on the opposite side of the 
street and several cars away.  Figueroa falsely stated in the 
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police report that he had seen L.M. walking down the street 
carrying the drugs in his right hand.  Parry gave the drugs he 
found in the gas cap to Figueroa, and Figueroa turned the 
drugs in as evidence. 
 
 August 21, 2009:  Stetser conducted a warrantless 
search of a trailer based on a tip that “J.M.” was selling drugs 
out of it.  He found 32 bags of crack cocaine in a 
compartment on the door of the trailer.  Figueroa falsely 
claimed in his police report that he had observed J.M. engage 
in a hand-to-hand drug transaction and that J.M. had 32 bags 
of a rock-like substance in his right pocket. 
 
On December 9, 2011, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict against Figueroa on Count 1 of conspiracy to deprive 
others of civil rights and on Counts 2 and 3 of substantive 
civil rights violations relating to incidents occurring between 
September 14 and September 17, 2008.  The jury acquitted 
Figueroa of the remaining counts and acquitted Bayard on all 
counts.  Figueroa filed motions for a judgment of acquittal, or 
in the alternative, a new trial under Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 29 and 33 on December 23, 2011.  The District 
Court denied both motions.  He was sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment on September 7, 2012.  This appeal followed. 
 
III. Discussion
1
 
 Figueroa challenges both his conviction and sentence 
on appeal.  Because the most significant issue in this appeal is 
the application of the drug distribution sentencing guideline 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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to Figueroa‟s civil rights violations, we will deal with that 
issue first. 
 
A. Application of the Drug Distribution 
Guideline 
 
Figueroa argues that the District Court erred in 
applying the drug distribution sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1, to his civil rights violations in this case because he 
was not convicted of offenses involving the distribution of 
drugs.
2
 
  
Figueroa was convicted of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
241 and 242.  The applicable sentencing guideline for these 
violations is U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1.  Under U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a), 
the base offense level should be the greatest of the 
enumerated options, including “the offense level from the 
offense guideline applicable to any underlying offense.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a).  Application Note 1 explains that 
“offense guideline applicable to any underlying offense” 
refers to “the offense guideline applicable to any conduct 
established by the conviction that constitutes an offense under 
federal, state, or local law . . ..”  U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1, 
Application Note 1.  Where the conduct established by the 
conviction constitutes more than one underlying offense, the 
court should look to the underlying offense that carries the 
highest offense level.  U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1, Application Note 1.  
                                                 
2
  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s 
construction of the Sentencing Guidelines but review the 
District Court‟s factual determinations for clear error.  United 
States v. Cordo, 324 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Additionally, under U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b), if the defendant was 
a public official or the offense was committed under color of 
law, the base offense level should be increased by 6 levels.  
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b). 
 
Here, the presentence report, in accordance with 
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1, presented an analysis of the conspiracy‟s 
underlying offenses and offense levels.  The presentence 
report concluded that applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the drug 
distribution sentencing guideline, would produce the highest 
offense level in Figueroa‟s case:  an offense level of 26.3  
Once increased by 6 levels as provided in U.S.S.G. § 
2H1.1(b), Figueroa‟s proposed offense level was 32.  At 
sentencing, the District Court adopted this base offense level 
over Figueroa‟s objection.   
 
In using U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to determine Figueroa‟s 
base offense level, the District Court relied heavily on a 
recent case, United States v. Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d 1, 16 
(1st Cir. 2012), in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that police officers who conspired to plant drugs on 
individuals to fabricate criminal offenses were properly 
convicted of conspiracy to possess controlled substances with 
an intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 
846.
4
  The court reasoned that the plain language of 21 U.S.C. 
                                                 
3
 The other underlying offenses and offense levels proposed 
in the presentence report were:  (1) illegal searches (offense 
level 18); (2) false reports (offense level 8); larceny (offense 
level 6); and perjury (offense level 17).   
4
 A violation of § 841(a) falls under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, and 
thus the Cortes-Caban analysis of the term “distribute” in § 
841(a) is relevant to Figueroa‟s sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 
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§ 841(a), which deems it “unlawful for any person knowingly 
or intentionally— (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, 
or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, 
a controlled substance . . .”, encompassed the police officers‟ 
conduct.  Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d at 16 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)).  The court focused on the meaning of “distribute” in 
the statute, noting that the Controlled Substances Act defines 
“to distribute” as “to deliver (other than by administering or 
dispensing) a controlled substance or a listed chemical” and 
defines “deliver” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, 
whether or not there exists an agency relationship.”  Id. at 17 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(11), 802(8)).
5
  Based on this 
definition of “distribute,” that court found that “[t]he 
defendants‟ acts of transferring drugs amongst each other and 
to the victims constitutes an intent to distribute the drugs 
under § 841(a)(1), which results in a transfer of possession of 
a controlled substance, in other words a „distribution,‟” and 
upheld the police officers‟ convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a) and 846.
6
  Id. at 18, 26.   
                                                                                                             
2D1.1.   
5
 The court interpreted “transfer” by reference to its 
commonly accepted meaning because it is not defined in the 
Controlled Substances Act.  Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d at 17 
(“To transfer means „to carry or take from one person or place 
to another . . . ; to move or send to a different location . . . ; to 
cause to pass from one person or thing to another.‟” (quoting 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2426-27 
(1993))). 
6
 We note that the police officers in Cortes-Caban, in addition 
to being convicted of violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 
846, were also convicted of civil rights violations under 18 
10 
 
 
In this case, the District Court, upon identifying the 
distribution of narcotics as an underlying offense based on 
relevant paragraphs of the superseding indictment, which “all 
allege trafficking in drugs, planting of drugs on individuals,” 
reviewed the evidence from trial regarding four specific 
instances of drug distribution on August 9th, September 17th, 
April 3rd and August 21st.  Applying the reasoning of Cortes-
Caban, the District Court stated:  “The [Cortes-Caban] 
defendants‟ act of transferring the drugs amongst each other 
and to the victims constitutes . . . a distribution.  And that‟s 
what happened in some of these instances here.”7  On that 
basis, the District Court found “beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [Figueroa] was involved in distribution of narcotics.”  
Because U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 is the offense guideline applicable 
to the distribution of narcotics, the District Court applied 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 here and adopted the proposed offense level 
of 32.
8
   
                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 241.  Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d at 5-6. 
7
 We note that the District Court adopted the reasoning of 
Cortes-Caban in a different context:  whereas the court in 
Cortes-Caban adopted this interpretation of “distribute” in 
reviewing police officers‟ convictions of conspiracy to 
possess controlled substances with the intent to distribute, the 
District Court in this case adopted this interpretation in 
sentencing Figueroa for convictions of civil rights violations 
involving the distribution of drugs.  However, this distinction 
does not affect our analysis here.   
8
 The District Court stated:  “For this guideline to apply there 
only needs to be 28 grams.  There‟s more than 28 grams in 
those four instances.  Therefore I think the Probation 
Department is correct as to the offense level, and I‟m going to 
11 
 
We conclude that the District Court correctly found 
that Figueroa engaged in distribution of narcotics and 
therefore its application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 was proper in 
this case.  In so holding, we adopt the court‟s interpretation in 
Cortes-Caban of the meaning of “distribute” under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a).  This interpretation comports with the plain 
language of the statute and its legislative history.  Under the 
plain language of the statute, a “distribution” encompasses the 
transfer of a controlled substance from one person or place to 
another and thus the planting of controlled substances on 
individuals to facilitate false arrests.  Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d 
at 17-18.  Congress made a deliberate choice to use broad 
language in § 841(a), and courts have interpreted “distribute” 
broadly in the context of § 841(a).  Id.  Moreover, the statute 
carves out specific exceptions for legitimate activities, such as 
the distribution of drugs by certain registered persons and by 
law enforcement officers lawfully engaged in the enforcement 
of controlled substances laws, which supports the application 
of § 841(a) to conduct outside those exceptions.  Id. at 18-19 
(citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 885(d)).  
       
In challenging his sentence, Figueroa attempts to rely 
on Judge Torruella‟s dissent in Cortes-Caban.9  Figueroa‟s 
                                                                                                             
find the total offense level is 32 in this case for the reasons 
expressed.”  Figueroa does not challenge the drug quantity 
calculation on appeal. 
9
 Judge Torruella dissented in Cortes-Caban on the basis that 
the majority‟s “analysis incorrectly center[ed] on whether the 
officers‟ actions could properly constitute „distribution,‟ an 
issue . . . not before [the court] . . .” and “blurr[ed] the 
distinction between the actus reus of one crime and the mens 
rea of another (distribution versus possession with intent to 
12 
 
reliance on this dissent is misplaced because Judge Torruella 
focused on the specific intent required to convict for 
possession of controlled substances with the intent to 
distribute.  Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d at 30-31 (Torruella, J., 
dissenting).  Here, however, the District Court did not find 
that Figueroa possessed narcotics with the intent to distribute 
but rather found that he was involved in the distribution of 
narcotics, a general intent crime.  The specific intent 
discussion in Judge Torruella‟s dissent is irrelevant here.10    
 
Figueroa also argues that, even under the Cortes-
                                                                                                             
distribute) . . . .” Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d at 30-31 (Torruella, 
J., dissenting).  Because the police officers in Cortes-Caban 
were convicted not of distribution but of possession with the 
intent to distribute, Judge Torruella asserted that the relevant 
inquiry was not whether the police officers‟ acts constituted 
distribution but whether the police officers had the specific 
intent to distribute controlled substances.  Id.  He concluded 
that the government had not proven the requisite specific 
intent and thus the police officers‟ convictions under 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846 should not be affirmed.  Id. at 47. 
10
 Figueroa also attempts to distinguish Cortes-Caban on the 
facts, but this attempt is unavailing.  First, he asserts that the 
police acts in Cortes-Caban were entirely unlawful.  Because 
his own acts were equally unlawful, this is not a convincing 
grounds on which to differentiate the instant case.  Second, he 
argues that the police officers in Cortes-Caban intended to 
introduce drugs into society‟s illicit channels.  This is 
inaccurate:  Judge Torruella noted in his dissent that “the 
drugs never left the control or authority of the police 
officers.”  Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d at 46 n.57 (Torruella, J., 
dissenting). 
13 
 
Caban interpretation of “distribution” in § 841, there was no 
“distribution” here.  Figueroa alleges that the only transfer of 
drugs was from Figueroa to the police evidence room and that 
“[t]he act of turning drugs into the police evidence room 
simply is not a criminal drug offense.”  This is an inaccurate 
characterization of the facts.  At sentencing, Figueroa‟s 
counsel suggested that at least one of the incidents involved a 
co-conspirator planting drugs on an individual or on the 
scene.  He stated:  “[t]hat except for Stetser‟s testimony about 
the stash in a tree, I believe all of the other incidents are 
incidents where Antonio Figueroa or someone with him at the 
scene took contraband and turned it in.  And so,  . . . I believe 
five out of six [of the incidents listed in the presentence 
report] don‟t fit into that category.”  Moreover, the District 
Court stated in response, “[e]ven if one does [involve the 
planting of drugs], then [Figueroa] is to be judged under  . . . 
the drug distribution guidelines . . ..”   
 
Because we conclude that Figueroa engaged in the 
distribution of drugs in committing civil rights violations, the 
District Court properly applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 in 
sentencing him.
11
  However, we urge that this application of 
the drug distribution sentencing guideline be strictly limited 
to civil rights violations in cases like this one where drug 
distribution constituted an active part of the civil rights 
violation, and where, as here, the District Court specifically 
finds that the drug distribution was clearly established by the 
                                                 
11
  We note that this application of § 841(a) to the planting of 
drugs by police officers is not a common application.  As the 
court noted in Cortes-Caban, there have not been any other 
decisions on prosecutions under § 841 for the planting of 
drugs.  691 F.3d at 22.  
14 
 
offense of conviction.
12
   
 
B. Challenges to the Conviction 
 Turning to Figueroa‟s challenge to his conviction, he 
raises four arguments:  (1) the District Court erred by 
admitting the out-of-court statement of co-defendant Robert 
Bayard, (2) the District Court erred by excluding, as 
cumulative, police reports that Figueroa offered into 
evidence, (3) the District Court erred by allowing improper 
expert opinion testimony from a prosecution fact witness on 
issues of constitutional law, and (4) the District Court erred 
by refusing to give the jury Figueroa‟s requested instruction 
concerning specific intent.  For the reasons that follow, these 
arguments are unavailing, and we will affirm his conviction. 
  
                                                 
12
 Figueroa also suggests in a footnote in his opening brief 
that “[a]pplying the Narcotics Distribution guidelines would . 
. . run afoul of [his] Sixth Amendment rights by virtue of the 
fact that the jury in this case . . . was not asked to consider a 
drug dealing case, thus its verdict cannot be construed as a 
finding that narcotics distribution occurred.”  The District 
Court‟s application of the drug distribution sentencing 
guidelines did not violate Figueroa‟s Sixth Amendment 
rights.  Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, “[o]ther than the fact 
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  Here, because Figueroa‟s sentence 
does not exceed the statutory maximum, this finding did not 
need to be made by a jury and thus Figueroa‟s Sixth 
Amendment rights were not violated. 
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First, Figueroa argues that the District Court erred by 
admitting an out-of-court statement by co-defendant 
Bayard.
13
  Figueroa challenges the admission of the following 
testimony by co-conspirator Parry regarding Bayard‟s out-of-
court statement about Figueroa: 
 
Q.  Did you have a conversation with Mr. 
Bayard during one of these three nights about 
the search at 1017 Spruce Street? 
 
A.  Yes, I did. 
 
Q.  What was said during that conversation? 
 
A.  Bayard was complaining about the report 
that Figueroa had written.  He said the report 
was F‟d up.  And he tried talking to Figs about 
the right way to write the report and he didn‟t 
want to listen. 
 
  The District Court admitted this statement as a 
statement in furtherance of the conspiracy under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) which provides that a statement 
“made by the party‟s coconspirator during and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy” is not hearsay.  Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).  
For a statement to be admitted under this rule, “the proponent 
                                                 
13
  “We review a District Court‟s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence for abuse of discretion, although our review is 
plenary as to the district court‟s interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.”  United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 
348 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
16 
 
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the 
conspiracy existed; (2) both the defendant and the declarant 
were members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was 
made in the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.”  United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 498 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  The furtherance requirement is usually given a 
broad interpretation.  Duka, 671 F.3d at 348   
 
Figueroa argues that Bayard‟s statement was not made 
in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore the third prong 
of this test was not met.  In response to Figueroa‟s post-trial 
motion on this issue, the District Court held that the statement 
was a comment on the inability to instruct a co-conspirator on 
how to write police reports so that no one got into trouble.  
We find ample evidence in the record to support the District 
Court‟s conclusion that the writing of false reports was part of 
the conspiracy and that Bayard‟s statement, expressing 
concern about Figueroa‟s inept report-writing, was in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.
14
 
                                                 
14
 Figueroa also challenges the admission of this statement 
under the Confrontation Clause and Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123 (1968).  The protections of the Confrontation 
Clause and Bruton apply only to testimonial statements.  See 
United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 126-29 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(noting that “where nontestimonial hearsay is concerned, the 
Confrontation Clause has no role to play in determining the 
admissibility of a declarant‟s statement” and that Bruton is 
also limited to testimonial statements).  Bayard‟s statement to 
Parry was not a testimonial statement.  See United States v. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (identifying as the core 
class of testimonial statements “ex parte in-court testimony,” 
“extrajudicial statements,” and “statements . . . made under 
17 
 
 Second, Figueroa argues that the District Court erred 
by excluding, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, police 
reports that Figueroa offered into evidence.
15
  Under Rule 
403, a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  Here, the District Court 
excluded the proffered police reports because the defendants 
failed to establish that the reports had any probative value 
beyond the fact that they were false, which the witness had 
already acknowledged in his testimony.  On that basis, the 
District Court concluded that giving these reports to the jury 
would “just wast[e] time.”  We conclude that there was no 
error in the District Court‟s exclusion of these reports. 
 
 Third, Figueroa argues that the District Court erred by 
allowing improper expert opinion testimony from a 
prosecution fact witness on issues of constitutional law.
16
  
Specifically, he alleges that prosecution fact witness Michael 
Lynch of the Camden Police Department impermissibly 
testified that a signed consent to search form was a 
                                                                                                             
circumstances, which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial”).  Therefore, Figueroa‟s Confrontation 
Clause and Bruton argument is inapposite. 
15
  “We review a district court‟s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence for abuse of discretion, and such discretion is 
construed especially broadly in the context of Rule 403.”  
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
16
  For standard of review see footnote 13. 
18 
 
constitutional requirement rather than just local police 
department procedure. 
   
 On direct examination, Lynch stated that a consent to 
search form must be signed before a search is conducted and 
then added, “that‟s not a Camden Police Department 
procedure, that the [sic] established by law and constitutional 
procedure.”  Figueroa did not contemporaneously object to 
this statement but instead questioned Lynch further on this 
point on cross-examination.  Figueroa subsequently objected 
to “the law or legal concepts . . . coming from the witness 
stand, from fact witnesses” and asserted that Lynch‟s 
testimony “has confused the jurors into thinking they have 
gotten some guidance on what the constitutional law is.”  In 
response to Figueroa‟s objection, the District Court found that 
the jury had not been left with an impression that Lynch was 
testifying about what the Constitution requires, stating, “[i]t 
was very clear to me and very clear to the jury [that the 
Camden Police Department procedures] is what the witness 
was talking about.”  At the conclusion of trial, the District 
Court properly instructed the jury on constitutional 
requirements concerning consent to search.  From our review 
of the record, we agree with the District Court‟s assessment 
that Lynch was testifying about Camden Police Department 
procedures, not constitutional law.   
 
 Fourth, Figueroa argues that the District Court erred by 
refusing to give the jury his requested instruction concerning 
specific intent under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
17
  The District Court 
                                                 
17
  “Review of the legal standard enunciated in a jury 
instruction is plenary, . . . but review of the wording of the 
instruction, i.e., the expression, is for abuse of discretion.”  
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instructed the jury that to convict under § 242, the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Figueroa (1) “acted under the color of law;” (2) “deprived a 
person or persons alleged in the particular count of the 
Indictment of their Constitutional liberty and property rights, 
without due process of law, or their Constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizures;” and (3) “acted 
knowingly, intentionally, and willfully.”  The District Court 
further instructed the jury:  
 
The specific intent required by law . . . is an 
intent to deprive a person of a federal right 
which has been made definite either by express 
terms of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States or by decisions interpreting them, or to 
act with reckless disregard of a constitutional 
requirement which has been made specific and 
definite. . .. 
 
You may find the particular defendant under 
consideration acted with the requisite specific 
intent, even if you find the defendant had no 
real familiarity with the specific constitutional 
rights involved, provided you find that the 
defendant under consideration willfully and 
consciously did the act which deprived the 
person of his or her constitutional rights. 
 
You may find a particular defendant acted 
                                                                                                             
United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 452 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citations omitted). 
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willfully if he performed an act in open defiance 
or reckless disregard of a constitutional 
[requirement] which has been made specific and 
definite. 
 
On appeal, Figueroa claims that the District Court 
erred by rejecting the following proposed instruction on the 
issue of specific intent: 
 
It is not necessary for the government to prove 
that the defendant was thinking in specific 
constitutional terms provided that the 
government proves that the defendant‟s aim was 
not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen 
of a right and that right was protected by the 
Constitution. 
 
 We find no error here.  The District Court‟s jury 
instruction correctly stated the law.  See United States v. 
Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a 
defendant “need not be „thinking in constitutional terms‟ in 
order to be convicted of violating § 242” and that “it is 
enough to trigger § 242 liability if it can be proved . . . that a 
defendant exhibited reckless disregard for a constitutional or 
federal right.” (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 
106 (1945))).  Furthermore, as the District Court noted, the 
use of the term “not to enforce local law” in Figueroa‟s 
proposed instruction is “very confusing.”  We conclude, 
therefore, that the District Court‟s jury instruction correctly 
stated the law and that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting Figueroa‟s proposed instruction.  
 
 C.   Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence 
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Finally, Figueroa argues that his sentence was 
substantively unreasonable based on the discrepancy between 
the length of his sentence and those of his co-conspirators.  
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an 
abuse of discretion standard, and the party challenging the 
sentence bears the burden of showing unreasonableness.  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).  
“A sentence that falls within the guidelines is more likely to 
be reasonable than one outside the guidelines range.”  United 
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006).  Figueroa 
has not borne his burden of proving the substantive 
unreasonableness of his within-guidelines sentence.  He has 
done no more than note the disparity between his sentence 
and the sentences of his co-conspirators.  This alone does not 
demonstrate substantive unreasonableness.  See United States 
v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress‟s 
primary goal in enacting § 3553(a)(6) was to promote 
national uniformity in sentencing rather than uniformity 
among co-defendants in the same case.”).  Therefore, 
Figueroa‟s sentence was not substantively unreasonable.  
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s judgments of conviction and sentence. 
